

29 October 1974

~~DDCI/IC~~

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Me too, but it's a fact of government life in DC

I must admit some frustration over all these good and "wise" people writing inadequate and partial papers to "help" you do your job. They feed off the initiatives and imagination of the workers, get public visibility to "their" pieces, and get professional status and financial remuneration for being expert. One helps them in the naive hope that their facts will be correct at least. *Describes a few around here*

However, having sounded off, Chip Pickett is trying to be helpful and I'm delighted to see someone like him in there. He is likely to be constructive and he listens well.

Thanks

Muses from the ranks of a "non-hero",

DCI/IC-3006/74
29 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Major George ("Chip") Pickett,
24 October 1974

A. Murphy Commission Paper


1. Chip Pickett, who works with Andy Marshall, has been requested by the Murphy Commission to provide comments on a specific intelligence related resource paper prepared by John Macy for the Commission. Instead, Chip advised he plans to write a different type paper built around several general issues.

2. We went over his outline of issues which range from the DCI role in budget review to long-range planning needs. Some of his observations on the issues were historic and out-paced. I advised Chip of our preliminary thinking toward presentation of National Intelligence Strategies for collection and analysis buttressed by planning of SIGINT and Imagery systems for out-year needs. To his concern over improving DCI reporting, I noted the concept of a DCI Annual Report to the President and explained that a first effort was under way to serve both the President and PFIAB. I advised that inputs from all Intelligence Community elements except State were in hand. I also noted that these materials would be useful in preparing Congressional material. Chip's view that there is the requirement to do better cross-program evaluation is a correct one but he agreed that we basically lack tools to accomplish this apples and pears value judgment in a non-intuitive fashion. In response to Chip's issue over short-falls in intelligence methodologies, I advised that he was incorrect in his basic assumption that nothing was on-going. I noted the wide variety of work under way and applied on new analytic methodologies and also in data handling, e.g., SAFE, DRAWSTRING, COINS, etc. I also noted steps being taken in the warning area (the nervous system) on which considerable time and resources were focused. Other matters were touched upon and Pickett seemed appreciative.

3. Nevertheless I took the opportunity to firmly state my own reservations over the Murphy Commission's present focus on the intelligence resource question. I observed that the content of his outline was pitched in too much managerial detail and clearly beyond what I could read into the Commission's charter or the intent of Murphy in his letter to the DCI. He agreed that my concerns were correct. He stated that he would make the point in the introduction to his paper and also adjust his pitch particularly to account for the national strategy theme and some thoughts we exchanged about introducing market mechanisms into the IC system. As a further checkpoint, he plans to pass his paper over Tom Latimer's desk and review it with me before forwarding it to the Commission.

B. Intelligence Support to Net Assessments

1. Chip also asked for suggestions on how best to "nudge" the Intelligence Community for intelligence support to net assessments. He explained that Andy Marshall had asked him to suggest ways to do this. I suggested that the case be made to General Wilson as Chairman of the Working Group of NSCIC. I noted that Andy and Wilson had not yet met ^{on the subject} and that a previous briefing session had been cancelled by Andy. A second course proposed would be through Deputy Secretary Clements presenting the needs (as a user) to the NSCIC. Lastly, Secretary Schlesinger could write to the DCI setting down his own views on the importance to net assessments of intelligence support. Chip seemed to favor the last approach. I explained to Chip the pressure of other important user needs on the Community's analytic base. I questioned whether the Community can get at the "soft" aspects of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military, e.g., training, rotations, incentives, etc. without considerable man-years of work and therefore the need to spell out the user's intended employment of the material in planning or decision processes would be helpful to us in setting priorities. I sensed from comments made that Marshall is concerned, particularly over DIA's analytic ability to be responsive.




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Thanks

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